183 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
183 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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author: Topics in Security and Privacy Technologies (CS 839)
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title: Course Welcome
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date: September 05, 2018
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---
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# Security and Privacy
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## It's everywhere!
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## Stuff is totally insecure!
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## It's really difficult!
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# What topics to cover?
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## A really, really vast field
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- Things we will not be able to cover:
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- Real-world attacks
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- Computer systems security
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- Defenses and countermeasures
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- Social aspects of security
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- Theoretical cryptography
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- ...
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## Theme 1: Formalizing S&P
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- Mathematically formalize notions of security
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- Rigorously prove security
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- Guarantee that certain breakages can't occur
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> Remember: definitions are tricky things!
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## Theme 2: Automating S&P
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- Use computers to help build more secure systems
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- Automatically check security properties
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- Search for attacks and vulnerabilities
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## Our focus: four modules
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1. Differential privacy
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2. Applied cryptography
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3. Language-based security
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4. Adversarial machine learning
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# Differential privacy
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## A mathematically solid definition of privacy
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- Simple and clean formal property
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- Satisfied by many algorithms
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- Degrades gracefully under composition
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# Applied crypto
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## Computing in an untrusted world
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- Proving you know something without revealing it
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- Certifying that you did a computation correctly
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- Computing on encrypted data, without decryption
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- Computing joint answer without revealing your data
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# Language-based security
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## Ensure security by construction
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- Programming languages for security
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- Compiler checks that programs are secure
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- Information flow, privacy, cryptography, ...
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# Adversarial machine learning
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## Manipulating ML systems
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- Crafting examples to fool ML systems
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- Messing with training data
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- Extracting training information
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# Tedious course details
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## Class format
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- Three components:
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1. Paper presentations
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2. Final project
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3. Class participation
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- Annoucement/schedule/materials: on [website](https://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~justhsu/teaching/current/cs839/)
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- Class mailing list: [compsci839-1-f18@lists.wisc.edu]()
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## Paper presentations
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- Sign up to lead a discussion on one paper
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- Suggested topic, papers, and schedule on website
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- Before each presentation:
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- I will send out brief questions
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- Please email me brief answers
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> If you want advice, come talk to me!
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## Final project
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- Work individually or in pairs
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- Project details and suggestions on website
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- Key dates:
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- **September 19**: Pick groups and topic
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- **October 15**: Milestone 1
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- **November 14**: Milestone 2
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- **End of class**: Final writeups and presentations
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> If you want advice, come talk to me!
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## Todos for you
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0. Complete the course survey
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1. Check out the course website
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2. Think about what paper you want to present
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3. Brainstorm project topics
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# Defining privacy
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## What does privacy mean?
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- Many kinds of "privacy breaches"
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- Obvious: third party learns your private data
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- Retention: you give data, company keeps it forever
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- Passive: you don't know your data is collected
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## Why is privacy hard?
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- Hard to pin down what privacy means!
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- Once data is out, can't put it back into the bottle
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- Privacy-preserving data release today may violate privacy tomorrow, combined
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with "side-information"
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- Data may be used many times, often doesn't change
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## Hiding private data
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- Delete "personally identifiable information"
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- Name and age
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- Birthday
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- Social security number
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- ...
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- Publish the "anonymized" or "sanitized" data
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## Problem: not enough
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- Can match up anonymized data with public sources
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- *De-anonymize* data, associate names to records
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- Really, really hard to think about side information
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- May not even be public at time of data release!
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## Netflix challenge
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- Database of movie ratings
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- Published: ID number, movie rating, and rating date
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- Attack: from public IMDB ratings, recover names for Netflix data
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## "Blending in a crowd"
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- Only release records that are similar to others
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- *k-anonymity*: require at least k identical records
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- Other variants: *l-diversity*, *t-closeness*, ...
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## Problem: composition
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- Repeating k-anonymous releases may lose privacy
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- Privacy protection may fall off a cliff
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- First few queries fine, then suddenly total violation
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- Again, interacts poorly with side-information
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## Differential privacy
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- Proposed by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, Smith (2006)
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> A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to one’s privacy, or in
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> general, any type of risk... should not substantially increase as a result of
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> participating in a statistical database. This is captured by differential
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> privacy.
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## Basic setting
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- Private data: set of records from individuals
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- Each individual: one record
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- Example: set of medical records
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- Private query: function from database to output
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- Randomized: adds noise to protect privacy
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## Basic definition
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A query $Q$ is **$(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private** if for every two
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databases $db, db'$ that differ in **one individual's record**, and for every
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subset $S$ of outputs, we have:
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$$
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\Pr[ Q(db) \in S ] \leq e^\varepsilon \cdot \Pr[ Q(db') \in S ] + \delta
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$$
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