Complete first lecture.
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@ -8,10 +8,16 @@ date: September 05, 2018
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## It's everywhere!
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## It's everywhere!
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![](images/iot-cameras.png)
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## Stuff is totally insecure!
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## Stuff is totally insecure!
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![](images/broken.png)
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## It's really difficult!
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## It's really difficult!
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![](images/netflix.png)
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# What topics to cover?
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# What topics to cover?
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## A really, really vast field
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## A really, really vast field
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@ -109,19 +115,68 @@ date: September 05, 2018
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# Defining privacy
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# Defining privacy
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## What does privacy mean?
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## What does privacy mean?
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- Many meanings of privacy
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- Many kinds of "privacy breaches"
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- Obvious: third party learns your private data
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- Retention: you give data, company keeps it forever
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- Passive: you don't know your data is collected
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## Why is privacy hard?
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## Why is privacy hard?
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- Hard to pin down what privacy means!
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- Once data is out, can't put it back into the bottle
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- Privacy-preserving data release today may violate privacy tomorrow, combined
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with "side-information"
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- Data may be used many times, often doesn't change
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## Hiding private data
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## Hiding private data
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- Remove "personally identifiable information"
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- Delete "personally identifiable information"
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- Name and age
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- Birthday
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- Social security number
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- ...
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- Publish the "anonymized" or "sanitized" data
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## Problem: not enough
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## Problem: not enough
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- Can match up anonymized data with public sources
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- *De-anonymize* data, associate names to records
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- Really, really hard to think about side information
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- May not even be public at time of data release!
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## Netflix challenge
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- Database of movie ratings
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- Published: ID number, movie rating, and rating date
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- Attack: from public IMDB ratings, recover names for Netflix data
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## "Blending in a crowd"
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## "Blending in a crowd"
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- Only release records that are similar to others
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- *k-anonymity*: require at least k identical records
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- Other variants: *l-diversity*, *t-closeness*, ...
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## Problem: composition
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## Problem: composition
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- Repeating k-anonymous releases may lose privacy
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- Privacy protection may fall off a cliff
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- First few queries fine, then suddenly total violation
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- Again, interacts poorly with side-information
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## Differential privacy
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## Differential privacy
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- Proposed by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, Smith (2006)
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> A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to one’s privacy, or in
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> general, any type of risk... should not substantially increase as a result of
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> participating in a statistical database. This is captured by differential
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> privacy.
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## Basic setting
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- Private data: set of records from individuals
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- Each individual: one record
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- Example: set of medical records
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- Private query: function from database to output
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- Randomized: adds noise to protect privacy
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## Basic definition
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## Basic definition
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A query $Q$ is **$(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private** if for every two
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databases $db, db'$ that differ in **one individual's record**, and for every
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subset $S$ of outputs, we have:
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$$
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\Pr[ Q(db) \in S ] \leq e^\varepsilon \cdot \Pr[ Q(db') \in S ] + \delta
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$$
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