diff --git a/website/docs/resources/slides/images/broken.png b/website/docs/resources/slides/images/broken.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d2563a
Binary files /dev/null and b/website/docs/resources/slides/images/broken.png differ
diff --git a/website/docs/resources/slides/images/iot-cameras.png b/website/docs/resources/slides/images/iot-cameras.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1bee50
Binary files /dev/null and b/website/docs/resources/slides/images/iot-cameras.png differ
diff --git a/website/docs/resources/slides/images/netflix.png b/website/docs/resources/slides/images/netflix.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59d8a4d
Binary files /dev/null and b/website/docs/resources/slides/images/netflix.png differ
diff --git a/website/docs/resources/slides/lecture01.md b/website/docs/resources/slides/lecture01.md
index a5dda20..0817bec 100644
--- a/website/docs/resources/slides/lecture01.md
+++ b/website/docs/resources/slides/lecture01.md
@@ -8,10 +8,16 @@ date: September 05, 2018
 
 ## It's everywhere!
 
+![](images/iot-cameras.png)
+
 ## Stuff is totally insecure!
 
+![](images/broken.png)
+
 ## It's really difficult!
 
+![](images/netflix.png)
+
 # What topics to cover?
 
 ## A really, really vast field
@@ -109,19 +115,68 @@ date: September 05, 2018
 # Defining privacy
 
 ## What does privacy mean?
-- Many meanings of privacy
+- Many kinds of "privacy breaches"
+    - Obvious: third party learns your private data
+    - Retention: you give data, company keeps it forever
+    - Passive: you don't know your data is collected
 
 ## Why is privacy hard?
+- Hard to pin down what privacy means!
+- Once data is out, can't put it back into the bottle
+- Privacy-preserving data release today may violate privacy tomorrow, combined
+  with "side-information"
+- Data may be used many times, often doesn't change
 
 ## Hiding private data
-- Remove "personally identifiable information"
+- Delete "personally identifiable information"
+    - Name and age
+    - Birthday
+    - Social security number
+    - ...
+- Publish the "anonymized" or "sanitized" data
 
 ## Problem: not enough
+- Can match up anonymized data with public sources
+- *De-anonymize* data, associate names to records
+- Really, really hard to think about side information
+    - May not even be public at time of data release!
+
+## Netflix challenge
+- Database of movie ratings
+- Published: ID number, movie rating, and rating date
+- Attack: from public IMDB ratings, recover names for Netflix data
 
 ## "Blending in a crowd"
+- Only release records that are similar to others
+- *k-anonymity*: require at least k identical records
+- Other variants: *l-diversity*, *t-closeness*, ...
 
 ## Problem: composition
+- Repeating k-anonymous releases may lose privacy
+- Privacy protection may fall off a cliff
+    - First few queries fine, then suddenly total violation
+- Again, interacts poorly with side-information
 
 ## Differential privacy
+- Proposed by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, Smith (2006)
+
+> A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to one’s privacy, or in
+> general, any type of risk... should not substantially increase as a result of
+> participating in a statistical database.  This is captured by differential
+> privacy.
+
+## Basic setting
+- Private data: set of records from individuals
+    - Each individual: one record
+    - Example: set of medical records
+- Private query: function from database to output
+    - Randomized: adds noise to protect privacy
 
 ## Basic definition
+A query $Q$ is **$(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private** if for every two
+databases $db, db'$ that differ in **one individual's record**, and for every
+subset $S$ of outputs, we have:
+
+$$
+\Pr[ Q(db) \in S ] \leq e^\varepsilon \cdot \Pr[ Q(db') \in S ] + \delta
+$$