

Proving Differential Privacy via Probabilistic Couplings

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
A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to one's privacy, or in general, any type of risk . . . should not substantially increase as a result of participating in a statistical database.

This is captured by differential privacy.

— Cynthia Dwork

Increasing interest

In research...



The screenshot shows a Google Scholar search interface. The search bar contains the text "differential privacy" and a search button. Below the search bar, the "Scholar" section displays "About 2,860,000 results (0.04 sec)", which is circled in red. The "Articles" section lists a result titled "Differential privacy: A survey of results" by C. Dwork, published in the "International Conference on Theory and Applications of ..." in 2008, published by Springer. The abstract discusses a new approach to privacy-preserving data analysis. The result is cited by 2333, has 32 versions, and is listed in the Web of Science. There are links for "Cite", "Save", and "More".

Google

differential privacy

Scholar

About 2,860,000 results (0.04 sec)

Articles

Differential privacy: A survey of results


[C. Dwork](#) - International Conference on Theory and Applications of ..., 2008 - Springer

Abstract Over the past five years a new approach to **privacy**-preserving data analysis has born fruit [13, 18, 7, 19, 5, 37, 35, 8, 32]. This approach differs from much (but not all!) of the related literature in the statistics, databases, theory, and cryptography communities, in that ...

Cited by 2333 [Related articles](#) [All 32 versions](#) [Web of Science: 331](#) [Cite](#) [Save](#) [More](#)


Increasing interest

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A screenshot of a Google Scholar search for "differential privacy". The search bar contains the text "differential privacy" and a magnifying glass icon. Below the search bar, the results are displayed. The first result is titled "Differential privacy: A survey of results" by C. Dwork, published in the "International Conference on Theory and Applications of ..." in 2008, published by Springer. The abstract states: "Over the past five years a new approach to **privacy**-preserving data analysis has born fruit [13, 18, 7, 19, 5, 37, 35, 8, 32]. This approach differs from much (but not all!) of the related literature in the statistics, databases, theory, and cryptography communities, in that ...". The result is cited by 2333, has 32 versions, and is listed in the Web of Science with 331 citations. The text "About 2,860,000 results (0.04 sec)" is circled in red.

...and in the "real world"



A presentation slide titled "Differential privacy". On the left, three smartphones are displayed, each showing a different app interface: a messaging app, a social media app, and a food-related app. On the right, a man in a blue shirt is speaking and gesturing with his hands.

D

Alice

Bob

Xavier

Donna

Ernie

Algorithm

Pr [r]


ratio bounded

Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith

Let $\epsilon \geq 0$ be a parameter, and suppose there is a binary adjacency relation Adj on D . A randomized algorithm $M : D \rightarrow \mathbf{Distr}(R)$ is ϵ -differentially private if for every set of outputs $S \subseteq R$ and every pair of adjacent inputs d_1, d_2 , we have


$$\Pr_{x \sim M(d_1)}[x \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \cdot \Pr_{x \sim M(d_2)}[x \in S].$$

Composition properties



Whole program is 2ϵ -private

Composition properties



Whole program is 2ϵ -private

Formally ...

Consider randomized algorithms $M : D \rightarrow \mathbf{Distr}(R)$ and $M' : R \rightarrow D \rightarrow \mathbf{Distr}(R')$. If M is ϵ -private and for every $r \in R$, $M'(r)$ is ϵ' -private, then the composition is $(\epsilon + \epsilon')$ -private:

$$r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} M(d); \text{res} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} M'(r, d); \text{return}(\text{res})$$

Differential privacy is a:

relational property of
probabilistic programs.

When privacy follows from composition. . .



When privacy follows from composition. . .



(Linear types, refinement types, self products, relational Hoare logics, . . .)

When privacy doesn't follow from composition...



When privacy doesn't follow from composition...



How to formally verify?

Use approximate coupling view of privacy to extend the logic apRHL

Combine smaller, pointwise proofs to prove differential privacy in apRHL

Get new, much simpler proofs using coupling composition principle

A crash course: apRHL [BKOZB]

Imperative language with sampling

$$x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e)$$

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approximate probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic

$$\vdash \{ \Phi \} c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \{ \Psi \}$$

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Non-probabilistic

A crash course: apRHL [BKOZB]

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Numeric index

Approximate liftings [BKOZB, BO]

Definition

Let $R \subseteq A \times A$ be a relation and $\epsilon \geq 0$. Two distributions $\mu_1, \mu_2 \in \mathbf{Distr}(A)$ are related by the ϵ -approximate lifting of R if there exists $\mu_L, \mu_R \in \mathbf{Distr}(A \times A)$ with:

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- ▶ $\pi_1(\mu_L) = \mu_1$ and $\pi_2(\mu_R) = \mu_2$;
- ▶ for every $S \subseteq A \times A$,

$$\Pr_{z \sim \mu_L}[z \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \cdot \Pr_{z \sim \mu_R}[z \in S]$$

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Write: $\mu_1 R^{\# \epsilon} \mu_2$

Interpreting judgments

$$\vdash \{ \Phi \} \quad C_1 \sim_{\epsilon} C_2 \quad \{ \Psi \}$$

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Memories related by Φ

Interpreting judgments

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Memories related by Φ



Distributions related by $\Psi^{\# \epsilon}$

Differential privacy in apRHL

$$\vdash \{Adj(d_1, d_2)\} \ c \sim_\epsilon \ c \ \{res_1 = res_2\}$$

Differential privacy in apRHL

$$\vdash \{Adj(d_1, d_2)\} \quad c \sim_\epsilon c \quad \{res_1 = res_2\}$$

Exactly ϵ -differential privacy

Proof system

$$\vdash \{\Psi \{e_1\langle 1 \rangle, e_2\langle 2 \rangle / x_1\langle 1 \rangle, x_2\langle 2 \rangle\}\} \quad x_1 \leftarrow e_1 \sim_0 x_2 \leftarrow e_2 \quad \{\Psi\} [\text{ASSN}]$$

$$\frac{}{\vdash \{|e_1 - e_2| \leq k\} \quad x_1 \stackrel{\#}{\sim}_{k \cdot \epsilon} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_1) \sim_{k \cdot \epsilon} x_2 \stackrel{\#}{\sim}_{k \cdot \epsilon} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_2) \quad \{x_1 = x_2\}} [\text{LAP}]$$

$$\frac{\vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \quad \{\Psi'\} \quad \vdash \{\Psi'\} \quad c'_1 \sim_{\epsilon'} c'_2 \quad \{\Psi\}}{\vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1; c'_1 \sim_{\epsilon + \epsilon'} c_2; c'_2 \quad \{\Psi\}} [\text{SEQ}]$$

$$\frac{\vdash \{\Phi \wedge b_1\langle 1 \rangle\} \quad c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \quad \{\Psi\} \quad \vdash \{\Phi \wedge \neg b_1\langle 1 \rangle\} \quad d_1 \sim_\epsilon d_2 \quad \{\Psi\}}{\vdash \{\Phi \wedge b_1\langle 1 \rangle = b_2\langle 2 \rangle\} \quad \text{if } b_1 \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } d_1 \sim_\epsilon \text{if } b_2 \text{ then } c_2 \text{ else } d_2 \quad \{\Psi\}} [\text{COND}]$$

$$\Theta \wedge e\langle 1 \rangle \leq 0 \Rightarrow \neg b_1\langle 1 \rangle$$

$$\frac{\vdash \{\Theta \wedge b_1\langle 1 \rangle \wedge b_2\langle 2 \rangle \wedge k = e\langle 1 \rangle \wedge e\langle 1 \rangle \leq n\} \quad c_1 \sim_{\epsilon_k} c_2 \quad \{\Theta \wedge b_1\langle 1 \rangle = b_2\langle 2 \rangle \wedge k < e\langle 1 \rangle\}}{\vdash \{\Theta \wedge b_1\langle 1 \rangle = b_2\langle 2 \rangle \wedge e\langle 1 \rangle \leq n\} \quad \text{while } b_1 \text{ do } c_1 \sim_{\sum_{k=1}^n \epsilon_k} \text{while } b_2 \text{ do } c_2 \quad \{\Theta \wedge \neg b_1\langle 1 \rangle \wedge \neg b_2\langle 2 \rangle\}} [\text{WHILE}]$$

$$\frac{\vdash \{\Phi'\} \quad c_1 \sim_{\epsilon'} c_2 \quad \{\Psi'\} \quad \Phi \Rightarrow \Phi' \quad \Psi' \Rightarrow \Psi \quad \epsilon' \leq \epsilon \quad \delta' \leq \delta}{\vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \quad \{\Psi\}} [\text{CONSEQ}]$$

Proof system

$$\vdash \{\Psi \{e_1\langle 1 \rangle, e_2\langle 2 \rangle / x_1\langle 1 \rangle, x_2\langle 2 \rangle\}\} \quad x_1 \leftarrow e_1 \sim_0 x_2 \leftarrow e_2 \quad \{\Psi\} [\text{ASSN}]$$

$$\frac{}{\vdash \{|e_1 - e_2| \leq k\} \quad x_1 \stackrel{\#}{\sim}_{\mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_1)} x_2 \stackrel{\#}{\sim}_{\mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_2)} \{x_1 = x_2\}} [\text{LAP}]$$

$$\frac{\vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \quad \{\Psi'\} \quad \vdash \{\Psi'\} \quad c'_1 \sim_{\epsilon'} c'_2 \quad \{\Psi\}}{\vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1; c'_1 \sim_{\epsilon+\epsilon'} c_2; c'_2 \quad \{\Psi\}} [\text{SEQ}]$$

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$$\frac{\vdash \{\Phi'\} \quad c_1 \sim_{\epsilon'} c_2 \quad \{\Psi'\} \quad \Phi \Rightarrow \Phi' \quad \Psi' \Rightarrow \Psi \quad \epsilon' \leq \epsilon \quad \delta' \leq \delta}{\vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \quad \{\Psi\}} [\text{CONSEQ}]$$

(Laplace) Sampling rule

$$\frac{\vdash \{|e_1 - e_2| \leq \mathbf{k}\} \quad x_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_1) \sim_{\mathbf{k} \cdot \epsilon} x_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_2) \quad \{x_1 = x_2\}}{\text{LAP}}$$

(Laplace) Sampling rule

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“Pay” distance between centers



Assume samples are equal

Sequence rule

$$\frac{\vdash \{\Phi\} c_1 \sim_{\epsilon} c_2 \{\Theta\} \quad \vdash \{\Theta\} c'_1 \sim_{\epsilon'} c'_2 \{\Psi\}}{\vdash \{\Phi\} c_1; c'_1 \sim_{\epsilon+\epsilon'} c_2; c'_2 \{\Psi\}} \text{SEQ}$$

Generalizes privacy composition

- ▶ Θ, Ψ assert equality on outputs

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Generalizes privacy composition

- ▶ Θ, Ψ assert equality on outputs

“Costs” sum up

Assume “paid” facts in rest of program

Approximate liftings are
approximate versions of
probabilistic couplings

The coupling perspective

Approximate liftings are
approximate versions of
probabilistic couplings

New liftings \iff New proof rules

New sampling rule: [LAPNULL]

$$\frac{x_1 \notin FV(e_1), x_2 \notin FV(e_2)}{\vdash \{T\} \quad x_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_1) \sim_0 x_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_2) \quad \{x_1 - x_2 = e_1 - e_2\}}$$

New sampling rule: [LAPNULL]

$$\frac{x_1 \notin FV(e_1), x_2 \notin FV(e_2)}{\vdash \{T\} \quad x_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_1) \sim_0 x_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_2) \quad \{x_1 - x_2 = e_1 - e_2\}}$$

“Pay” zero cost



Distance between samples

=

Distance between centers

New sampling rule: [LAPGEN]

$$\frac{x_1 \notin FV(e_1), x_2 \notin FV(e_2)}{\vdash \{|e_1 - (e_2 + s)| \leq k\} \quad x_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_1) \sim_{k,\epsilon} x_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_\epsilon(e_2) \quad \{x_1 = x_2 + s\}}$$

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“Pay” distance to shift centers



Assume shifted samples

New lifting principle: combining pointwise liftings

$$\frac{\text{for all } v, \quad \vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \quad \{(e_1 = v) \rightarrow (e_2 = v)\}}{\vdash \{\Phi\} \quad c_1 \sim_\epsilon c_2 \quad \{e_1 = e_2\}} \text{PW-EQ}$$

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Separate proofs for each output

New lifting principle: combining pointwise liftings

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Separate proofs for each output



Combine for differential privacy

Logical interpretation

Leibniz equality

$$(\forall v, (e_1 = v) \rightarrow (e_2 = v)) \rightarrow e_1 = e_2$$

Internalizing a universal quantifier

- ▶ Not sound in general
- ▶ Sound for certain equality predicates

Logical interpretation

\forall values, \exists a lifting such that ...



\exists a lifting such that \forall values, ...

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

Logical interpretation

\forall values, \exists a lifting such that ...



\exists a lifting such that \forall values, ...

Putting it all together



Please see the paper!

A brief preview: the Above Threshold algorithm

```
AT( $t, d$ ) = {  
   $i \leftarrow 1; x \leftarrow 0;$   
   $\tilde{t} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_{\epsilon/2}(t);$   
  while  $i \leq k$  do  
     $s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}_{\epsilon/4}(q[i](d));$   
    if ( $s \geq \tilde{t} \wedge x = 0$ ) then  $x \leftarrow i;$   
     $i \leftarrow i + 1;$   
  return  $x$   
}
```

A brief preview: the Above Threshold algorithm

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AT( $t, d$ ) = {  
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    if ( $s \geq \tilde{t} \wedge x = 0$ ) then  $x \leftarrow i;$   
     $i \leftarrow i + 1;$   
  return  $x$   
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```

Standard composition: $AT(t, -)$ is $k\epsilon$ -private

A brief preview: the Above Threshold algorithm

```
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  while  $i \leq k$  do  
     $s \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{\epsilon/4}(q[i](d))$ ;  
    if ( $s \geq \tilde{t} \wedge x = 0$ ) then  $x \leftarrow i$ ;  
     $i \leftarrow i + 1$ ;  
  return x  
}
```

~~Standard composition: $AT(t, -)$ is $k\epsilon$ -private~~

In fact: $AT(t, -)$ is ϵ -private

Complicated privacy proof(s)

3.1 Privacy Proof for Algorithm 1

We now prove the privacy of Algorithm 1. We break the proof down into two steps, to make the proof easier to understand, and, more importantly, to point out what confusions likely caused the different non-private variants of SVT to be proposed. In the first step, we analyze the situation where the output is \perp , a length- ℓ vector (\perp, \dots, \perp) , indicating that all ℓ queries are tested to be below the threshold.

LEMMA 1. Let A be Algorithm 1. For any neighboring datasets D and D' , and any integer ℓ , we have

$$\Pr[A(D) = \perp^\ell] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[A(D') = \perp^\ell].$$

PROOF. We have

$$\Pr[A(D) = \perp^\ell] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\perp}(D, x, L) dx,$$

$$\text{where } f_{\perp}(D, x, L) = \Pr[\rho = x] \prod_{i \in L} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i < T_i + x], \quad (1)$$

and $L = \{1, 2, \dots, \ell\}$.

The probability of outputting \perp^ℓ over D is the summation (or integral) of terms $f_{\perp}(D, x, L)$, each of which is the product of $\Pr[\rho = x]$, the probability that the threshold noise equals x , and $\prod_{i \in L} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i < T_i + x]$, the conditional probability that \perp^ℓ is the output on D given that the threshold noise ρ is x . (Note that given D , T_i , the queries, and ρ , whether one query results in \perp or not depends completely on the noise v_i and is independent from whether any other query results in \perp .) If we can prove

$$f_{\perp}(D, x, L) \leq e^\epsilon f_{\perp}(D', x + \Delta, L), \quad (2)$$

then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[A(D) = \perp^\ell] &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\perp}(D, x, L) dx \\ &\leq \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^\epsilon f_{\perp}(D', x + \Delta, L) dx \quad \text{from (2)} \\ &= e^\epsilon \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{\perp}(D', x', L) dx' \quad \text{let } x' = x + \Delta \\ &= e^\epsilon \Pr[A(D') = \perp^\ell]. \end{aligned}$$

This proves the lemma. It remains to prove Eq (2). For any query q , because $|q(D) - q(D')| \leq \Delta$ and thus $-q(D) \leq \Delta - q(D')$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[q(D) + v_i < T_i + x] &= \Pr[v_i < T_i - q_i(D) + x] \\ &\leq \Pr[v_i < T_i + \Delta - q_i(D') + x] \\ &= \Pr[q_i(D') + v_i < T_i + (x + \Delta)]. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

With (3), we prove (2) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} f_{\perp}(D, x, L) &= \Pr[\rho = x] \prod_{i \in L} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i < T_i + x] \\ &\leq e^\epsilon \Pr[\rho = x + \Delta] \prod_{i \in L} \Pr[q_i(D') + v_i < T_i + (x + \Delta)] \\ &= e^\epsilon f_{\perp}(D', x + \Delta, L). \end{aligned}$$

□

That is, by using a noisy threshold, we are able to bound the probability ratio for all the negative query answers (i.e., \perp 's) by e^ϵ , no matter how many negative answers there are.

We can obtain a similar result for positive query answers in the same way.

$$\text{Let } f_{\top}(D, x, L) = \Pr[\rho = x] \prod_{i \in L} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i \geq T_i + x].$$

We have $f_{\top}(D, x, L) \leq e^\epsilon f_{\top}(D', x - \Delta, L)$, and thus

$$\Pr[A(D) = \top^\ell] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[A(D') = \top^\ell].$$

This likely contributes to the misunderstandings behind Algorithm 5 and 6, which treat positive and negative answers exactly the same way. The problem is that while one is free to choose to bound positive or negative side, one cannot bound both.

We also observe that the proof of Lemma 1 will go through if no noise is added to the query answers, i.e., $v_i = 0$, because Eq (3) holds even when $v_i = 0$. It is likely because of this observation that Algorithm 5 adds no noise to query answers. However, when considering outcomes that include both positive answers (\top 's) and negative answers (\perp 's), one has to add noises to the query answers, as we show below.

THEOREM 2. Algorithm 1 is ϵ -DP.

PROOF. Consider any output vector $a \in \{\perp, \top\}^\ell$. Let $a = (a_1, \dots, a_\ell)$, $\mathbb{1}^{\perp} = \{i : a_i = \perp\}$, and $\mathbb{1}^{\top} = \{i : a_i = \top\}$. Clearly, $|\mathbb{1}^{\perp}| \leq \ell$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[A(D) = a] &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(D, x) dx, \text{ where} \\ g(D, x) &= \Pr[\rho = x] \prod_{i \in \mathbb{1}^{\perp}} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i < T_i + x] \prod_{i \in \mathbb{1}^{\top}} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i \geq T_i + x]. \end{aligned}$$

We want to show that $g(D, x) \leq e^\epsilon g(D', x + \Delta)$. This suffices to prove that $\Pr[A(D) = a] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[A(D') = a]$. Note that $g(D, x)$ can be written as:

$$g(D, x) = f_{\perp}(D, x, \mathbb{1}^{\perp}) \prod_{i \in \mathbb{1}^{\top}} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i \geq T_i + x].$$

Following the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that $f_{\perp}(D, x, \mathbb{1}^{\perp}) \leq e^\epsilon f_{\perp}(D', x + \Delta, \mathbb{1}^{\perp})$, and it remains to show

$$\prod_{i \in \mathbb{1}^{\top}} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i \geq T_i + x] \leq e^\epsilon \prod_{i \in \mathbb{1}^{\top}} \Pr[q_i(D') + v_i \geq T_i + x + \Delta]. \quad (4)$$

Because $v_i = \text{Lap}(\frac{\Delta}{c})$ and $|q_i(D) - q_i(D')| \leq \Delta$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[q_i(D) + v_i \geq T_i + x] &= \Pr[v_i \geq T_i + x - q_i(D)] \\ &\leq \Pr[v_i \geq T_i + x - \Delta - q_i(D')] \quad (5) \\ &\leq e^{\frac{\Delta}{c}} \Pr[v_i \geq T_i + x - \Delta - q_i(D') + 2\Delta] \quad (6) \\ &= e^{\frac{\Delta}{c}} \Pr[q_i(D') + v_i \geq T_i + x + \Delta]. \end{aligned}$$

Eq (5) is because $-q_i(D) \geq -\Delta - q_i(D')$, and Eq (6) is from the Laplace distribution's property. This proves Eq (4). □

The basic idea of the proof is that when comparing $g(D, x)$ with $g(D', x + \Delta)$, we can bound the probability ratio for all outputs of \perp to no more than e^ϵ by using a noisy threshold, no matter how many such outputs there are. To bound the ratio for the \top outputs to no more than e^ϵ , we need to add sufficient Laplacian noises, which should scale with c , the number of positive outputs.

Now we turn to Algorithms 3-6 to clarify what are wrong with their privacy proofs and to give their DP properties.

Many slightly different versions

Figure 1: A Selection of SVT Variants

Input/Output shared by all SVT Algorithms

Input: A private database D , a stream of queries $Q = q_1, q_2, \dots$ each with sensitivity no more than Δ , either a sequence of thresholds $T = T_1, T_2, \dots$ or a single threshold T (see footnote *), and c , the maximum number of queries to be answered with T .
Output: A stream of answers a_1, a_2, \dots , where each $a_i \in \{\perp, \perp\} \cup \mathbb{R}$ and \mathbb{R} denotes the set of all real numbers.

Algorithm 1 An instantiation of the SVT proposed in this paper.

```

Input:  $D, Q, \Delta, T, c$ .
1:  $\rho = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ , count = 0
2: for each query  $q_i \in Q$  do
3:    $\nu_i = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
4:   if  $q_i(D) + \nu_i \geq T_i + \rho$  then
5:     Output  $a_i = \top$ 
6:     count = count + 1, Abort if count  $\geq c$ .
7:   else
8:     Output  $a_i = \perp$ 
9:   end if
10: end for
    
```

Algorithm 2 SVT in Dwork and Roth 2014 [8].

```

Input:  $D, Q, \Delta, T, c$ .
1:  $\rho = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ , count = 0
2: for each query  $q_i \in Q$  do
3:    $\nu_i = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
4:   if  $q_i(D) + \nu_i \geq T + \rho$  then
5:     Output  $a_i = \top$ ,  $\rho = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
6:     count = count + 1, Abort if count  $\geq c$ .
7:   else
8:     Output  $a_i = \perp$ 
9:   end if
10: end for
    
```

Algorithm 3 SVT in Roth's 2011 Lecture Notes [15].

```

Input:  $D, Q, \Delta, T, c$ .
1:  $\rho = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ , count = 0
2: for each query  $q_i \in Q$  do
3:    $\nu_i = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
4:   if  $q_i(D) + \nu_i \geq T + \rho$  then
5:     Output  $a_i = q_i(D) + \nu_i$ 
6:     count = count + 1, Abort if count  $\geq c$ .
7:   else
8:     Output  $a_i = \perp$ 
9:   end if
10: end for
    
```

Algorithm 4 SVT in Lee and Clifton 2014 [13].

```

Input:  $D, Q, \Delta, T, c$ .
1:  $\rho = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ , count = 0
2: for each query  $q_i \in Q$  do
3:    $\nu_i = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
4:   if  $q_i(D) + \nu_i \geq T + \rho$  then
5:     Output  $a_i = \top$ 
6:     count = count + 1, Abort if count  $\geq c$ .
7:   else
8:     Output  $a_i = \perp$ 
9:   end if
10: end for
    
```

Algorithm 5 SVT in Stoddard et al. 2014 [18].

```

Input:  $D, Q, \Delta, T$ .
1:  $\rho = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
2: for each query  $q_i \in Q$  do
3:    $\nu_i = 0$ 
4:   if  $q_i(D) + \nu_i \geq T + \rho$  then
5:     Output  $a_i = \top$ 
6:   else
7:     Output  $a_i = \perp$ 
8:   end if
9:   end if
10: end for
    
```

Algorithm 6 SVT in Chen et al. 2015 [1].

```

Input:  $D, Q, \Delta, T = T_1, T_2, \dots$ .
1:  $\rho = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
2: for each query  $q_i \in Q$  do
3:    $\nu_i = \text{Lap}(\frac{2\Delta}{c})$ 
4:   if  $q_i(D) + \nu_i \geq T_i + \rho$  then
5:     Output  $a_i = \top$ 
6:   else
7:     Output  $a_i = \perp$ 
8:   end if
9:   end if
10: end for
    
```

	Alg. 1	Alg. 2	Alg. 3	Alg. 4	Alg. 5	Alg. 6
Scale of threshold noise ρ	$2\Delta/c$	$2c\Delta/c$	$2\Delta/c$	$4\Delta/c$	$2\Delta/c$	$2\Delta/c$
Reset ρ after each output of \top	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Scale of query noise ν_i	$4c\Delta/c$	$4c\Delta/c$	$2c\Delta/c$	$4\Delta/3c$	0	$2\Delta/c$
Outputting $q_i + \nu_i$ instead of \top	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Stop after outputting c \top 's	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Privacy Property	ϵ -DP	ϵ -DP	∞ -DP**	$(\frac{115\epsilon}{3})$ -DP	∞ -DP	∞ -DP

Figure 2: Differences among Algorithms 1-6.

Use approximate coupling view of privacy to extend the logic apRHL

Combine smaller, pointwise proofs to prove differential privacy in apRHL

Get new, much simpler proofs using coupling composition principle

Use approximate coupling view of privacy to extend the logic apRHL

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(Also, I might be looking for a job . . .)